According to Aviation Week, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth laid out a hugely ambitious strategy on November 7 to transform the American defense acquisition system. The plan is detailed in a 43-page memorandum that commands changes across every function, from requirements-setting to arms exports, targeting the Pentagon’s massive $300 billion acquisition enterprise. The strategy’s core focus is speed, with forms of the words “speed” and “accelerate” appearing 83 times in the document. However, the analysis points out the memo says surprisingly little about where the new money will come from to fund its key reforms and largely overlooks the crucial role of the military departments in making it happen.
The Good: Ambitious Vision, Familiar Problems
Look, there’s a lot to like here. Hegseth’s diagnosis of the system’s pathologies is spot-on. We’re talking about fragmented authority, perverse incentives that favor gold-plated performance over cost and schedule, and practices that basically strangle private investment. Naming the problem clearly is the first step. And by putting his personal authority and brand at the front of this campaign, he’s trying to avoid the fate of past reform efforts—like the Packard Commission or Better Buying Power—which stalled under bureaucratic resistance. His relentless focus on speed is also smart strategy. In a world where commercial tech moves at light speed, the Pentagon’s glacial pace is a major vulnerability. So far, so good.
The Bad: Where’s the Money and Muscle?
Here’s the thing, though. Big ideas are cheap. Execution is brutally expensive and political. And this memo is weirdly silent on the two things that actually make change happen: money and muscle.
Let’s talk money first. Many of the concrete reforms—like buying “government purpose rights” for a “right to repair,” or qualifying redundant suppliers, or buying in large, efficient quantities—cost more upfront. They’re investments for long-term savings. But the Pentagon’s budget world is a one-year-at-a-time circus. There’s zero incentive for a program manager to spend more now to save money a decade from now. The article notes the fiscal 2026 budget request shows no growth, so these costs aren’t just magically appearing in some “positive wedge.” Until Hegseth shows where the cash is coming from, why would any savvy acquisition manager or corporate executive risk their neck to follow these commands? They won’t. It’s that simple.
The Ugly: Ignoring the Military Branches
But the bigger oversight might be the “muscle” part. The memo’s four-page appendix of “Initial Directed Implementation Actions” has over two dozen directives to officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. And only one—about expanding acquisition education—is addressed to the actual military departments (Army, Navy, Air Force). That’s kind of insane.
Think about it. The military departments are the ones who actually run the programs, set the requirements, and have to fight with the new systems. They’re the muscle. If they’re not bought in, energized, and given clear marching orders, this whole transformation will fizzle in the corridors of the Pentagon. Bypassing them or giving them a token role betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of how the building actually works. You can’t decree change from the top floor and expect the people on the ground to just salute and make it happen. They have to want to make it happen.
Will This Time Be Different?
So, can Hegseth pull it off? The opportunity is there. The political stars might even be aligned. But history is not on his side. Every previous secretary has tried some version of this. The article’s author, who worked on the 1997 Defense Reform Initiative, learned the hard way that no reform happens without budget and organizational heft.
Hegseth has started with a compelling vision. But a memo, even a 43-page one, isn’t a transformation. It’s just a declaration of intent. The real work—the brutal, thankless, political work of finding new money and winning over the military services—is still ahead. And until we see concrete plans for that, this is just another catalog of good ideas destined for a shelf. The question isn’t whether the ideas are right. It’s whether the system is capable of swallowing the medicine it so desperately needs.
