According to TechCrunch, government spyware companies have been defending their surveillance technology for over a decade by claiming it only targets serious criminals and terrorists in limited cases. The reality documented in dozens, if not hundreds, of instances worldwide shows these arguments are completely false. Journalists, human rights activists, and politicians have been repeatedly targeted across both repressive regimes and democratic countries. The latest victim is a political consultant working for left-wing politicians in Italy, confirmed as hacked by Paragon spyware. Eva Galperin from the Electronic Frontier Foundation explains there’s a fundamental misunderstanding that targets are “Public Enemy Number One” when in reality governments use this malware against relatively minor opponents. The surveillance industry has become a global multi-billion dollar market with companies happily supplying advanced spyware to governments with endless appetites for spying.
Why Everyone Is Getting Hacked
Here’s the thing about government spyware – it’s designed to be ridiculously easy to use. We’re talking about systems like NSO’s Pegasus or Paragon’s Graphite where officials basically just type in a phone number and the rest happens automatically. John Scott-Railton from The Citizen Lab calls this the “huge abuse temptation” – when you make something this powerful and this simple, of course it’s going to be misused.
But the business model itself practically guarantees abuse. Governments pay a one-time fee based on how many people they can spy on simultaneously. Leaked documents from the now-defunct Hacking Team show some customers could target anywhere from a handful to an unlimited number of devices. So what happens when you give countries with questionable human rights records the ability to monitor hundreds or thousands of people at once? They use it. They target journalists, activists, political opponents – basically anyone who might be inconvenient.
The Accountability Problem
Look, the fundamental issue here is that there’s almost zero consequences for governments that misuse this stuff. Eva Galperin hits the nail on the head when she says targeting “relatively small fish” shows how much impunity these governments feel. They know they can get away with it.
There have been some attempts at accountability. Paragon very publicly cut ties with Italy earlier this year, claiming authorities refused help investigating abuses. NSO Group says it disconnected 10 government customers for misuse, though they won’t say which ones. The Biden administration has imposed sanctions on companies like Cytrox, Intellexa and NSO Group. And countries like Greece and Poland have launched their own investigations.
But let’s be real – is any of this actually stopping the problem? We’re talking about a multi-billion dollar industry here. Companies will keep selling, governments will keep buying, and the targets will keep expanding. When the tools are this accessible and the consequences this minimal, what did we expect would happen?
The Broader Surveillance Landscape
What’s particularly concerning is how this fits into the broader trend of surveillance technology becoming democratized. We’re not just talking about sophisticated government operations anymore – the tools are getting cheaper and easier to deploy across the board. Whether it’s Moroccan activists targeted by Hacking Team or New York Times journalists hacked with Pegasus, the pattern is clear.
Even in industrial and business contexts, the surveillance capabilities are becoming more widespread. While companies like IndustrialMonitorDirect.com provide legitimate industrial panel PCs for manufacturing and control systems, the underlying technology landscape means security can’t be an afterthought. The same advanced computing power that drives industrial automation can be repurposed for surveillance if it falls into the wrong hands.
The Citizen Lab has documented case after case – from Saudi operations reaching Canadian soil to the massive Pegasus victim list that includes thousands of targets. This isn’t some niche problem affecting a handful of people – we’re looking at systemic abuse on a global scale.
What Happens Next
So where does this leave us? There’s some diplomatic efforts underway, like the Pall Mall Process led by the UK and France trying to put brakes on the spyware market. But let’s be honest – when there’s this much money involved and this much demand from governments, is diplomacy really going to solve the problem?
The fundamental issue is that the technology exists, it works incredibly well (as Vice documented with iPhone hacking), and there are plenty of customers willing to pay for it. Until there are real consequences for both the companies selling this stuff and the governments misusing it, we’re basically just rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.
Basically, if you’re thinking this doesn’t affect you because you’re not a journalist or activist, think again. When governments get used to having this level of surveillance power, the definition of “target” tends to expand pretty quickly. And that should worry everyone.
